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HOW CAN THE SUPREME COURT NOT “UNDERSTAND” PATENT
LAW?
GREG REILLY*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court does understand patent law. This invited Essay
responds to Federal Circuit Judge Dyk’s remarks at the Chicago-Kent
Supreme Court IP Review, in particular, his observation that the patent “bar
and the academy have expressed skepticism that the Supreme Court
understands patent law well enough to make the governing rules” (a view
Judge Dyk did not endorse). The idea that the Supreme Court does not
understand the law of patents is implausible. Even more generous
interpretations of this criticism – that the Supreme Court insufficiently
understands innovation policy, insufficiently understands the patent system
that Congress desired in creating the Federal Circuit, or insufficiently
understands the technical facts to resolve patent issues – do not hold up
under closer scrutiny. Rather, those leveling this charge against the Supreme
Court are mistaking policy disagreement for a lack of understanding. This
mistake, even if one primarily of rhetoric, has potentially negative
consequences for understanding the role of patent law, promoting
productive debates about patent law and policy, and preserving the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy in patent law and patent law’s (perhaps limited)
contribution to the constraints imposed by legal authority in our society.

* Assistant Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks for Jonathan Jianu for research
assistance. Thanks to Paul Gugliuzza, Josh Sarnoff, and Ted Sichelman for helpful comments and
criticisms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent “bar and the academy have expressed skepticism that the
Supreme Court understands patent law well enough to make the governing
rules,” observed Judge Timothy B. Dyk of the U.S. Court of Appeals in his
remarks at Chicago-Kent College of Law’s Supreme Court IP Review,
reprinted in the last issue of this journal.1 Judge Dyk’s comment was purely
descriptive, not an endorsement.2 To the contrary, Judge Dyk noted in his
normal wry and understated way3 that this view was “an attitude not likely
to be endearing to the Supreme Court.”4 Judge Dyk is certainly right about
1. Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 80 (2016).
2. Nor is Judge Dyk likely to share this view. He was a noted Supreme Court litigator before being
appointed to the bench and is well-known for his efforts to more closely align Federal Circuit precedent
with Supreme Court decisions.
3. The author served as a law clerk to Judge Dyk in 2006-2007.
4. Dyk, supra note 1.
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that. But Judge Dyk’s observation is worth further exploration, both because
it is surprising that nine of the most talented legal minds in the country might
not comprehend a certain body of law and because it is problematic either
that this is true or that large segments of the patent community believe it to
be true.
Judge Dyk’s descriptive claim is undoubtedly correct. Popular voices
within the practicing patent bar contend, for example, that “it is shocking
that all nine Justices of the Supreme Court know so little about patent law,
yet the collective fate of the industry rests with only a cursory understanding
of patent law – and that is at best!”5 Although more measured, academic
commentary notes, for example, that “skeptics might doubt the technical
competence of the Supreme Court to fully grapple with patent doctrine“ and
describes a perception in the patent community of “the Court’s perceived
incompetence in patent affairs.”6
If these views are right, it is deeply troubling. For the patent community,
“[t]he Supreme Court is the ultimate judicial authority on patent law,”7 which
raises serious concerns if it does not comprehend this area for which it is
given so much power. For the legal community, more generally, the Supreme
Court’s inability to understand at least some areas of law would threaten the
very idea of a generalist high court as the final arbiter of what the law is in
our system of government.8
But we need not pause long on these dire consequences. The idea that
the Supreme Court – nine of the most qualified and brilliant legal minds in
the country – does not understand the law of patents is simply implausible.
Even more generous interpretations of this criticism of the Supreme Court –
that it insufficiently understands innovation policy, insufficiently
understands the patent system that Congress desired in creating the Federal
Circuit, or insufficiently understands the technical facts to resolve patent
issues – do not hold up under the closer scrutiny provided in Part II. This is
not to say that the Supreme Court always reaches the optimal, or even bestsupported, outcome in patent cases. Instead, the point is that any “errors” it
5. Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, IPWATCHDOG
(Mar.
20,
2012),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-vprometheus/id=22920/. This Essay cites IPWatchdog at various points as representative of segments of
the patent community that contend the Supreme Court does not understand patent law. Although
IPWatchdog often has a particularly strong viewpoint, it is repeatedly ranked among the top legal blogs
and, after PatentlyO, is probably the most influential outlet for information about patent law. See About,
IPWATCHDOG, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
6. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 73, 75 (2010) (noting but not
endorsing).
7. Id. at 74.
8. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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does make are the normal result of human decision making and/or generalist
review of specialized areas of law, rather than a particular lack of
understanding of patent law.
In short, this Essay is skeptical of the skepticism expressed by segments
of the patent bar and academy about the Supreme Court’s ability to
understand patent law. Rather, Part III suggests that those leveling the charge
against the Supreme Court are mistaking policy disagreement for a lack of
understanding. Even if this mistake is one of rhetoric, not substance, it is not
harmless. Framing policy disagreement in the guise of an inability to
understand patent law masks the extent to which patent law is a matter of
public policy, incorrectly suggests an inherently “true” version of patent law,
undermines patent law’s flexibility in responding to the changing needs of
society, and encourages further polarization within an already divided patent
community. It also threatens to delegitimize the Supreme Court’s authority
in patent law and bolster efforts to circumvent the Supreme Court’s
decisions, undermining (at least in a small way) the constraints law imposes
in our society.
II. DISSECTING THE CRITICISM THAT THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT
“UNDERSTAND” PATENT LAW
To evaluate the critics’ claim that the Supreme Court does not
understand patent law, it is first necessary to explore what the critics mean.
Perhaps they mean it literally – that the Supreme Court does not comprehend
the legal doctrines and principles of patent law. Or perhaps they are being
imprecise when they describe the Supreme Court’s alleged
misunderstanding as being about the law of patents and instead mean that the
Supreme Court does not sufficiently comprehend the innovation policy
advanced by patent law, the patent system desired by Congress when it
created the Federal Circuit, or the technical context of patent cases. This Part
considers these possibilities in turn, finding each unconvincing.
A. Does the Supreme Court Misunderstand the Law of Patent Cases?
The critics of the Supreme Court within the patent community might
mean exactly what they say – that the Supreme Court does not understand
the law of patents: the statutory provisions, doctrines, and legal principles
that govern patent cases.9 Even aside from its technical facts, patent law is a
9. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 5 (arguing that the Supreme Court showed an improper
understanding of patent law by conflating the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness with the
requirements of patent-eligible subject matter).
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famously complex and difficult area of law to apply, with arcane and
confusing doctrines.10 It undoubtedly poses challenges for those without
legal training – the scientists and business people who interact with the patent
system – as well as those who are legally trained but inexperienced in patent
law, like generalist lawyers and district judges.
For that reason, patent law is probably not among the easier legal
subjects for the Supreme Court Justices and their law clerks, who are
generalists handling at most a couple of patent cases a year. But there is little
reason to think the Justices and their clerks are incapable of overcoming the
complexity and challenges presented by the law of patents.11 They are, of
course, among the brightest legal minds in the country. Nor is patent law any
more challenging than many of the other areas of law on the Supreme Court’s
docket, such as whether “[w]hen an ERISA-plan participant wholly
dissipates a third-party settlement on non-traceable items, the plan fiduciary
may . . . bring suit to attach the participant’s separate assets”; whether
“Section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which pre-empts state bankruptcy
laws that enable insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the
objections of creditors and instead requires municipalities to restructure such
debts under Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code, pre-empts the Puerto
Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act”; or whether
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has the authority under the
Federal Power Act to “regulate wholesale market operators’ compensation
of demand response bids because the practices at issue directly affect
wholesale rates.”12 And the Justices and their clerks are aided in
understanding patent law generally and the issues in any case specifically by
an elite Supreme Court bar that is actively involved in patent cases, often on
both sides, and extensive involvement by amici.
In fact, compared to other legally complex areas on the Supreme
Court’s docket, patent law issues are probably easier for the Supreme Court
Justices and their clerks to grasp. Unlike detailed, intricate, and legally
technical statutes that the Supreme Court frequently grapples with, like the
tax code, bankruptcy statute, or ERISA, the Patent Act “sets the basic
10. Lee, supra note 6, at 12-13.
11. Cf. Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 829 (2016) (“[T]he Court has, I think correctly, called into question the notion
that patent law expertise is necessary to decide patent cases . . .”). Occasional comments by some Justices,
primarily Justice Scalia, about not knowing patent law generally or in its entirety should not be confused
as saying that the Justices do not understand the specific issues that are presented to them in specific
cases. See David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Precedent and
Policy, 66 SMU L. REV. 633, 636, 636 n.14 (2013) (citing comments by Justice Scalia).
12. See October Term 2015, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2015/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (listing cases from October Term 2015).

2017

HOW CAN THE SUPREME COURT NOT “UNDERSTAND” PATENT LAW?

297

parameters for patentability and infringement” in broad and general terms –
such as that the invention cannot be “obvious” or the patent must include a
“written description of the invention” – but “it does not specify in detail how
those basic principles are to be applied.”13 Nor is it like other areas of law on
the Supreme Court’s docket where the gaps in a statute have been filled by
complex and detailed regulations promulgated by an expert administrative
agency, such as environmental law regulations issued by the EPA or
communications regulations issued by the FCC. The Patent Office lacks
substantive rulemaking authority and plays a minor role in the development
of substantive patent law.14
For these reasons, “the patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a
common law enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the
interstices or to create doctrine emanating solely from Article III’s
province.”15 Indeed, “a significant portion of U.S. patent law, including some
of the most important and controversial patent law doctrines, is either built
upon judicial interpretation of elliptical statutory phrases, or is devoid of any
statutory basis whatsoever. Thus, while Congress and the courts each have a
hand in constructing the latticework of patent law, judges . . . are the
principal architects.”16 Even if patent law is a complex and intricate area of
law, it should be comparatively easier for the Supreme Court to understand
than the complex statutory and regulatory schemes on the Supreme Court’s
docket because patent law features judge-made complexity and intricacy. In
fact, many of the patent law doctrines that critics charge the Supreme Court
with misunderstanding are the creation of the Supreme Court itself (even if
not necessarily this particular composition of the Court).17 It defies reason to
conclude that the Supreme Court – the top judges in the country – is
incapable of understanding an area of law of which they, and their colleagues
on the federal bench, are the principal authors.
Perhaps the critique is more muted. Perhaps the criticism is not that the
Supreme Court is incapable in theory of understanding, or has always
misunderstood, the law of patents. Rather, perhaps the critique is that the
Supreme Court does not understand the current body of doctrines and legal
principles that govern patent law. Since 1982, patent law has been

13. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1638
(2003).
14. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 76-77
(2010).
15. Id. at 53.
16. Id.
17. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 389-90 (2001) (describing role of the Supreme Court in developing patent law in 19 th century).
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significantly shaped by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has nationwide intermediate appellate jurisdiction in patent cases and
has replaced and revised many patent law doctrines.18 Maybe when critics
say that the Supreme Court does not understand patent law, they mean that
the Supreme Court does not understand the law of patents that the Federal
Circuit has crafted over the past thirty-five years.19
As an initial matter, it is implausible that the Supreme Court is
incapable of understanding the legal doctrines and principles crafted by the
Federal Circuit. To be sure, the Federal Circuit has more knowledge of, and
experience with, its version of patent law than the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court is a generalist court that handles, at most, a couple of patent
cases a year, whereas the Federal Circuit is a specialized court that handles
hundreds of patent cases a year.20 But that does not mean that the Supreme
Court is incapable of understanding the patent law principles that do come
before it. As a generalist court with a limited docket, the Supreme Court
frequently has less experience with legal doctrines than the lower courts it
reviews, whether the issue be criminal sentencing, administrative law, or
bankruptcy. But the Supreme Court Justices (and their clerks) are highly
intelligent and skilled legal minds who are perfectly capable of learning the
legal doctrines and principles relevant to the cases on their docket, and there
is no reason to think this is less true with patent law principles originally
crafted by the Federal Circuit. After all, these principles were crafted by
other judges not much different than the Supreme Court Justices – the
majority of Federal Circuit judges lack a scientific background and had
limited experience with patent law before joining the bench.21
Moreover, the contention that the Supreme Court does not understand
the Federal Circuit’s version of patent law treats the Federal Circuit’s version
as the “correct” or “true” version of patent law and the Supreme Court’s

18. Nard, supra note 14, at 74-75.
19. Chief Judge Paul Michel, Lecture: Innovation, Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law
Reform: Should Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation Management to the Courts?, 20
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1157 (2010) (then-Chief Judge of Federal Circuit
arguing that the Supreme Court struggles to “getting it right in patent law” because it “doesn’t really
understand the case law” and identifying some Federal Circuit case law the Supreme Court allegedly
misunderstood).
20. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 665 (2009).
21. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2010 (2013) (“Only a handful of the Federal Circuit judges hold scientific
degrees.”); Golden, supra note 20, at 666 (“Since the [Federal] Circuit’s formation, only a minority of its
judges have had notably substantial pre-Federal Circuit involvement with patent law.”).

2017

HOW CAN THE SUPREME COURT NOT “UNDERSTAND” PATENT LAW?

299

departure from it as a misunderstanding, mistake, or error.22 But the Federal
Circuit is an inferior federal court, and “[t]he Supreme Court is the ultimate
judicial authority on patent law.”23 Given the significant discretion Congress
has given to federal courts to craft patent law, and the Supreme Court’s
position at the top of the federal court system, for the most part, the Supreme
Court cannot misunderstand patent law because Congress has delegated to
the Supreme Court primary responsibility to define what patent law is, at
least within the broad and unrestrictive boundaries of the statute and subject
to normal constraints on common law decision making like stare decisis.24
In truth, critics contending that the Supreme Court does not understand the
Federal Circuit’s version of patent law really mean that they prefer the public
policy choices made in the Federal Circuit case law to those made in the
Supreme Court decisions, a point I return to in Part III.
B. Does the Supreme Court Misunderstand Innovation Policy?
A second possibility is that the critics do not mean that the Supreme
Court misunderstands the law of patents, but rather that it misunderstands
what the law of patents is trying to achieve. That is, the complaint is that the
Supreme Court misunderstands patent law’s underlying substantive
objective – promoting innovation – and how patent doctrines relate to that
objective.25 To the extent the Supreme Court does not understand innovation
policy and/or the effects of patent law on innovation, the Supreme Court is
just like the rest of us. Economist Fritz Machlup famously evaluated the costs
and benefits of the patent system in the 1950s and concluded: “if we did not
have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But
since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible
on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.”26
Despite a great deal of research and analysis regarding the patent system in
the interim, Machlup’s conclusion still largely reflects the best

22. Michel, supra note 19, at 1157 (suggesting the reason the Supreme Court disagreed with Federal
Circuit case law is that it misunderstood it).
23. Lee, supra note 6, at 74.
24. Hayden W. Gregory, IP and the Romance with Its Policymakers, 8 LANDSLIDE 16, 20 (2016)
(rejecting the contention that the Supreme Court “simply does not understand patent law” because
“Supreme Court decisions are patent law”).
25. See Gene Quinn, Naked Emperors: A Supreme Court Patent Tale, IPWATCHDOG (May 31,
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/31/naked-emperors-a-supreme-court-patent-tale/id=58110/
(contending that Supreme Court’s lack of understanding in patent cases is hindering innovation and
dissemination of information in the software field).
26. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 39-40 (4th ed. 2016).
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understanding of the relationship between the patent system and innovation
and economic policy.27
Moreover, a suggestion that the Supreme Court does not understand
innovation policy is particularly odd. Many commentators have praised the
Supreme Court’s recent intervention in patent law “for placing policy at the
forefront of its decision making in patent cases,” noting that “rather than
relying solely on precedent to answer important disputes in patent cases, it
welcomes amicus briefs addressing underlying policies and real-world
effects of its decisions, vets matters of policy at oral argument, and
articulates in its opinions policies supporting its resolution of patent law
disputes.”28 In this regard, the Supreme Court compares favorably to the
Federal Circuit, which is widely criticized “for failing to identify policies
underlying patent-law doctrines, for omitting from their written opinions
detailed analyses of competing interpretations and applications of these
doctrines in light of these policies, and, ultimately, for adopting
interpretations and applications based on either no stated policy analysis or
a truncated one.”29 Thus, the Supreme Court is far more engaged with
innovation policy and makes a far greater effort to explicitly craft doctrines
and legal principles in light of the needs of innovation policy, at least
compared to the Federal Circuit.
The critics’ concern thus seems less that the Supreme Court
misunderstands innovation policy as that the Supreme Court has a different
vision of innovation policy than its critics. Indeed, those contending that the
Supreme Court does not understand patent law tend to also criticize the
Supreme Court’s decisions as a policy matter for weakening patent rights to
the detriment of inventors.30 The Supreme Court’s policy choices regarding
patent law are certainly open to dispute, but that should not be conflated with
the assumption that the Supreme Court does not understand these policy
choices, as addressed in more detail in Part III. To the contrary, the evidence
suggests that the Supreme Court is deeply engaged and carefully weighs
innovation policy in reaching its patent decisions, even if its critics are
unhappy with the results it reaches.31
27. See id. at 40.
28. Taylor, supra note 11, at 636.
29. Id. at 635.
30. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning
Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 3-4, (1999) (contending in same article that Supreme
Court Justices have flawed reasoning in patent cases and have “certain assumptions about patent policy”
that involve “skepticism and hostility about the patent system and about patents”); Quinn, supra note 25.
31. See Lisa Ouellette, Cultural Cognition of Patents, 4 IP THEORY 28, 30 (2014) (“[E]ven people
who say they agree that the goal of the patent system is promote innovation often disagree on the existing
facts.”).

2017

HOW CAN THE SUPREME COURT NOT “UNDERSTAND” PATENT LAW?

301

C. The Supreme Court Misunderstands the Patent System Created by
Congress?
Related to the first two possibilities, perhaps the critics of the Supreme
Court do not mean that the Supreme Court misunderstands patent law and
innovation policy generally, but rather that it misunderstands the policy
judgments, and patent law principles embodying them, made by Congress
through enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.32 The
FCIA created the Federal Circuit, the most significant event in the patent
system in decades.33 It emanated from two primary concerns: first,
uncertainty in the scope and strength of patent rights resulting in variations
among the regional circuits in their application of patent law and the resulting
forum shopping; and second, an erosion in the value and incentives provided
by patents as a result of this uncertainty and the frequent invalidation of
patents in those circuits hostile to patent rights.34
In light of the FCIA, maybe the critics do not mean that the Supreme
Court misunderstands patent law but rather that it misunderstands its place
in shaping patent law. On this view, patent law is no longer (largely) what
the Supreme Court says it is because the Federal Circuit now has primary
responsibility for developing patent law and implementing patent policy.35
But this view is unconvincing. The Federal Circuit is the primary driver of
patent law only because of its centralized appellate jurisdiction and volume
of cases, not because of any change to the hierarchy of the federal courts or
the Supreme Court’s power and authority.36 To the contrary, Congress
purposefully created the Federal Circuit as an intermediate appellate court
subject to the Supreme Court’s review, “so that a generalist tribunal would
have ultimate authority over patent jurisprudence.”37 Regardless of any
doubts created by the FCIA, the Supreme Court remains the “tribunal with

32. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
33. Nard, supra note 14, at 74.
34. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1989).
35. Cf. Golden, supra note 20, at 658 (noting that the Supreme Court’s role as the “tribunal with the
final say on ‘what the law is’ . . . is open to question when, as with patent law, the Court reviews the work
of another appellate tribunal having virtually exclusive jurisdiction over initial appeals”).
36. See Michel, supra note 19 (noting that the Federal Circuit is in a “hierarchical system” and must
follow “the precedents of the Supreme Court” but that the Supreme Court has “so few cases and so little
experience” as compared to the Federal Circuit”).
37. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal
Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 506-507 (2013); see also Janis, supra note 17, at 392 (noting
that “Congress also ensured that decisions of the Federal Circuit were reviewable at the Supreme Court
by grant of certiorari” and that “proponents of the Federal Circuit legislation understood Supreme Court
review to be important, at least symbolically”).
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the final say on ‘what the law is’” for patent law no less than any other area
of law.38
Alternatively, critics may believe the Supreme Court is ignoring a
mandate from Congress in the FCIA to create patent law doctrines that
promote certainty, predictability, and strong patent rights.39 Uncertainty and
weakened patent rights were the concerns motivating the creation of the
Federal Circuit. But the tool Congress used to address these concerns was
the Federal Circuit itself, not any mandates regarding the content of
substantive patent law. The belief was that the Federal Circuit’s centralized
appellate jurisdiction would improve certainty and predictability as
compared to the divergent approaches of the regional circuits, which would
in turn enhance the value and strength of patent rights.40 Nothing in the FCIA
or its legislative history changed the substantive statutory provisions to
improve certainty and strengthen patent rights or otherwise constrained the
courts’ discretion in filling in the broad statutory commands with a common
law of patents.41
Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the Supreme Court
misunderstands the patent system created by Congress in the FCIA, either in
term of its role vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit or in terms of the scope of the
Court’s discretion in developing a common law of patents.
D. The Supreme Court Misunderstands the Technical Facts of Patent
Cases?
A final interpretation of the criticism that the Supreme Court does not
understand patent law is that the critics really mean that the Supreme Court
does not sufficiently understand the technical facts of patent cases to resolve
issues of patent law.42 This interpretation is more plausible because, unlike
questions of law, where Supreme Court justices and their clerks are highly
skilled, the Supreme Court justices and their clerks, for the most part, lack
scientific or technical backgrounds and are neophytes when it comes to the
technology in patent cases.43

38. See Golden, supra note 20, at 658.
39. See Quinn, supra note 25 (noting that Supreme Court decisions have resulted in uncertainty and
weaker patent rights in software industry).
40. See Nard, supra note 14, at 75 (describing Federal Circuit’s effect in improving predictability
and strengthening patent rights).
41. See id. at 74-77 (suggesting the creation of the Federal Circuit confirmed the dominance of the
common law in patent cases).
42. See Quinn, supra note 25 (noting that “[t]he idea that the Supreme Court is at all capable of
understanding – let alone deciding – issues of a technical nature is ridiculous.”).
43. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 76 (2010).
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But if the criticism of the Supreme Court is really about its lack of
technical training and understanding, the criticism is both overly narrow and
overly broad. The criticism is overly narrow because the Supreme Court
justices are not the only technical neophytes resolving patent cases. The vast
majority of federal district judges, law clerks, and jurors lack technical
training.44 Even “[o]nly a handful of the Federal Circuit judges hold
scientific degrees,”45 though the majority of their clerks are technically
trained. If the Supreme Court lacks sufficient scientific or technical
understanding to resolve patent issues, this is true of virtually the entire
patent litigation system. This criticism, then, would be part of much larger
concerns about the imperfect fit between law and science and the difficulties
resolving scientific issues in court.46 But it would tell us little about the
comparative abilities and role of the Supreme Court in relation to other
institutions in the patent system.47
The criticism of the Supreme Court’s supposed misunderstanding of
technical issues is also overly broad. As compared to other lay decision
makers in the patent system, the Supreme Court may actually be best situated
to fulfill its role, which demands comparatively limited engagement with
technical and scientific information. “Unlike district judges, Justices of the
Supreme Court do not manage complicated factfinding” that requires
substantial engagement with the technical facts.48 By my count, at least 62%
of Supreme Court patent decisions over the past decade required no
engagement with the technical facts because they addressed either
procedural issues (e.g., the burden of proof, the standard for an injunction,
etc.) or pure questions of law (e.g., the scienter necessary for indirect
infringement, the standard necessary to prove willful infringement, etc.).49

44. Id. at 10-11, 15-17.
45. Wasserman, supra note 21.
46. See Greg Reilly, Rethinking the PHOSITA in Patent Litigation, 48 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 101
(2017) (summarizing connection between patent litigation and general concerns about science and
litigation).
47. If anything, criticism of the Supreme Court’s lack of technical competence would counsel for a
greater role in patent litigation for the comparative technical experts in the Patent Office.
48. Lee, supra note 43, at 77.
49. The Written Description blog identifies twenty-nine Supreme Court patent decisions between
October Term 2005 and October Term 2015. See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION,
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). Of these, nine
involved only procedural issues (eBay, MedImmune, Carlsbad, Microsoft v. i4i, Caraco, Kappos, Gunn,
Medtronic, Highmark); nine involved pure questions of law that did not depend on any technical context
(Illinois Tool Works, Quanta, Global-Tech, Stanford, Actavis, Octane, Commil, Kimble, Halo/Stryker);
four involved legal questions that arguably required information about the technical context (Microsoft
v. AT&T, Bowman, Limelight, Cuozzo); and seven involved issues that definitely required at least some
information about the technical context (KSR, Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, Nautilus, Alice, Teva).
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In the minority of cases where technical engagement is required, the
technology is often undisputed and/or relatively simple.50 Moreover, even
when some technical context may be useful or necessary, the Supreme
Court’s job is to resolve big-picture questions of law that apply beyond the
individual case to cases involving a variety of technologies. The Supreme
Court rarely even applies its legal holding to the facts of the specific case,
remanding to the lower courts to do so in the first instance.51 Critics of the
Supreme Court often assume the Supreme Court must perfectly understand
the entire field of technology to resolve patent cases,52 when in reality it only
has to understand specific aspects of the (often undisputed) technology
sufficiently well to provide the necessary context to resolve the primarily
legal issues on its docket. It seems likely that the highly intelligent Supreme
Court Justices and clerks, assisted by able briefing from the parties and
amici, can handle this limited engagement with technology. In fact, I am only
aware of one Supreme Court case over the past decade (Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.) where the Supreme Court is
said to have reached the wrong result because it misunderstood the
technology at issue, as opposed to the statute, precedent, or policy.53
Even Justice Scalia’s famous concurrence in the Myriad case, which is
often taken as evidence that the Supreme Court insufficiently understands
technology to resolve patent cases, makes exactly this point. Justice Scalia
essentially criticizes the majority for providing more technical information
than he believed necessary to resolve the question before the Court.54 Justice
50. See Lee, supra note 43, at 77 (“For example, the Court may be somewhat shielded from the
most complex inventions; one criterion for seeking Supreme Court review of patent cases is that the
underlying technologies are relatively simple.”). For example, the technologies in Bilski and Alice were
business and financial concepts, with the use of generic computer components recited at a high level of
generality. Nor does there appear to have been much dispute about what the underlying technology was
or how it worked (as opposed to the legal consequences) in cases like KSR, Mayo, and Nautilus.
51. See id. at 63 (“[B]ecause of the Court’s relatively small patent docket, Supreme Court Justices
themselves rarely have to apply these standards.”).
52. See, e.g., Steven Salzberg, Supreme Court Gets Decision Right, Science Wrong, on Gene
Patents, FORBES (June 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2013/06/13/supremecourt-gets-decision-right-science-wrong/#2e6ef58b12cc (complaining about aspects of Supreme Court’s
background description of the technology without suggesting in any effect on the outcome).
53. See, e.g., Noam Prywes, The Supreme Court’s Sketchy Science, SLATE (June 14, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/supreme_court_patent_case_science
_the_justices_misunderstand_molecular_biology.html (“The meaning of this [Myriad] ruling is
complicated significantly by the court’s sketchy understanding of molecular biology.”); but cf. Timothy
B. Lee, The Supreme Court doesn’t understand software, and that’s a problem, VOX (June 20, 2014),
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824426/the-supreme-court-doesnt-understand-software-and-thats-aproblem (contending that the Supreme Court does not understand software, but really seeming to object
to Supreme Court’s policy decision allowing patenting of some software).
54. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“[S]ome portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I
am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief.”).
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Scalia then noted that even if he did not understand the technology in its
entirety, he sufficiently understood the technology to resolve the specific
issue presented in the case after “having studied the opinions below and the
expert briefs presented here.”55
The Supreme Court may struggle to understand complex technology.
But that does not mean that it insufficiently understands the technology to
fulfill its role in the patent system – resolving big-picture legal issues based
on technical facts that are often undisputed. To criticize the Supreme Court
as insufficiently understanding technology to resolve patent cases is to
criticize the entire system of lay decision making in patent cases. This is an
interesting theoretical discussion, but lay decision making is the practical
reality in patent law.
III. THE POLICY DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN SEGMENTS OF THE PATENT
COMMUNITY AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. Recharacterizing the Criticisms of the Supreme Court as Policy
Disagreements
On closer inspection, the criticism that the Supreme Court does not
understand patent law does not stand-up, or at least offers no stronger basis
to criticize the Supreme Court’s handling of patent cases than to criticize the
concept of generalist Supreme Court review as a whole. And, yet, this view
is commonly held in significant portions of the patent community. What
explains this? Is much of the patent community simply misunderstanding the
Supreme Court’s understanding?
One possibility is that some in the patent community do reject the basic
notion of a generalist Supreme Court with final authority to say “what the
law is” in all areas of federal law, even those in which it is less experienced
than the lower courts.56 If that is the case, then the objection is not so much
that the Supreme Court misunderstands patent law as that Marbury was
wrongly decided, Congress’s structuring of the federal courts is flawed,
and/or perhaps even the framers of the Constitution erred in providing that
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
55. Id. (“It suffices for me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and the expert briefs
presented here, that the portion of DNA isolated from its natural state sought to be patented is identical
to that portion of the DNA in its natural state; and that complementary DNA (cDNA) is a synthetic
creation not normally present in nature.”).
56. See Quinn, supra note 25 (“In a world becoming more complex and specialized by the day it is
utter fantasy to believe that a homogenous group of senior citizens from Ivy League schools who have no
scientific training possesses the breadth and depth of knowledge to wisely pontificate on any and every
subject, particularly those relating to cutting edge technology.”).
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Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”57 Again, this is an interesting theoretical debate, but it
is beyond the scope of this Essay.
The more likely possibility is that some in the patent community
mistake disagreement for a lack of understanding. When they say that the
Supreme Court does not “understand” patent law, they really mean that the
Supreme Court’s decisions differ from their policy preferences regarding
patent law and/or are unwise as a matter of public policy. I do not mean to
claim any novel insight is this regard. I am sure many who follow debates
over patent law, and even those who do not but have read the preceding
analysis, easily recognize that arguments framed about the Supreme Court’s
lack of understanding are really arguments about the wisdom of the Supreme
Court’s policy choices. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the
language of misunderstanding for exactly what it is – rhetoric used to bolster
the critics’ policy preferences.
The evidence of policy disagreement, not actual misunderstanding by
the Supreme Court, follows largely from the analysis in Part II. As explained
above, it is implausible that the Supreme Court does not understand the
current legal doctrines and principles of patent law, at least those raised in
the cases before it, nor does the Court’s work require deep engagement with
technical facts that it more plausibly might misunderstand. Moreover, the
Court is deeply engaged in exploring and analyzing the policy consequences
of its decisions, rebutting the suggestion that it misunderstands innovation
policy. What really bothers the critics seems unlikely to be the Supreme
Court’s understanding of the issues and policy.
Instead, it seems that what really bothers the critics is the Supreme
Court’s conclusions – how it resolves those issues and policy considerations.
In particular, critics are concerned with two consequences of the Court’s
decisions: that they have weakened patent rights and decreased certainty and
predictability in the patent system.58 The critics themselves intermingle
claims of the Supreme Court’s misunderstanding with objections to the
Supreme Court’s policy choices, treating the two as equivalent. For example,
one popular commentator contended that the Supreme Court in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. improperly
“conflate[d] novelty and non-obviousness with patent eligibility” based on
their “cursory understanding of patent law,” only to acknowledge a few
paragraphs later that the Supreme Court was “well aware” of the different
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
58. See Quinn, supra note 25 (noting that Supreme Court decisions have resulted in uncertainty and
weaker patent rights in software industry).
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patentability requirements and consciously intermingled (some) elements of
novelty with patent eligibility.59 Thus, the commentator’s real concern was
not the Supreme Court’s lack of understanding of patent law but rather that
the Supreme Court made an intentional decision to place significant weight
on the patent eligibility inquiry of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in a way that the
commentator believed would create uncertainty and unpredictability and
weaken patent rights.60 This is representative of other similar criticisms of
the Supreme Court demonstrating that claims of lack of understanding are
really proxies for policy disagreements.61
Perhaps it is inevitable that some critics of the Supreme Court would
package their policy disagreements as misunderstanding by the Supreme
Court. Commentators are capable of vigorously disagreeing with the
Supreme Court’s policy choices without characterizing their disagreement
as misunderstanding by the Court.62 However, there is added rhetorical
punch to contending that the Supreme Court does not understand patent law
or got patent law wrong, rather than saying that the Supreme Court made the
wrong choice as a matter of public policy. This is especially true because the
Supreme Court essentially has the last word on patent law (subject to an
unlikely legislative override by Congress). Rather than accept that the
Supreme Court made a legitimate public policy choice within the authority
granted to it by Congress, albeit one they believe is misguided, it may be
cognitively easier for these critics to feel that their side of the public policy
debate lost only because the Supreme Court did not understand the issues
presented to it. This is particularly likely in expert communities, like the
patent community arguably is, which attempt to retain control over their area
of expertise by claiming a monopoly on the relevant knowledge and resisting
input and authority of non-expert superiors.63
59. See Quinn, supra note 5.
60. Id. (contending that the Supreme Court’s intermingling of the doctrines resulted “in a ‘know it
when you see it’” inquiry and meant “patentees and patent applicants get screwed!”). The Supreme
Court’s analysis was not without any basis, as Section 101 of the Patent Act requires inventions to be
“new and useful.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
61. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 24 (noting that disagreements about patent policy are often
phrased as “the Court simply does not understand patent law”); Chisum, supra note 30 (contending in
same article that Supreme Court Justices have flawed reasoning in patent cases and have “certain
assumptions about patent policy” that involve “skepticism and hostility about the patent system and about
patents”).
62. See, e.g., Neal Solomon, The Disintegration of the American Patent System, IPWATCHDOG (Jan.
26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/26/disintegration-american-patent-system/id=77594/
(contending that “an activist U.S. Supreme Court supplied a series of decisions from 2006 to 2016 that
substantially eroded patent rights” and “had a profound adverse effect on the economy” without
suggesting that the Court did not know what it was doing).
63. Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 110-11, 123-27 (2015). Although the patent community has diversified over
the past two decades with the increasing involvement of general litigators, it remains composed in
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B. The Danger of Using the Language of Ignorance and Error to
Characterize Policy Disagreements.
The difference between critics saying that the Supreme Court does not
“understand” patent law and that it is making misguided public policy
choices is largely one of rhetoric, not substance. Again, most informed
readers probably understand exactly what the critics mean by the language
of misunderstanding – the Supreme Court is making choices that are unwise
as a matter of public policy and with which the critics disagree. Critics
undoubtedly have a reasonable basis to disagree with the Supreme Court’s
policy choices, and such disagreement is essential to a productive debate that
ultimately improves the quality of patent law. Yet, the rhetoric of
misunderstanding has at least four negative consequences that make it an
undesirable feature of modern patent law debates.
First, the rhetoric of misunderstanding suggests that there is only one
“true” or “correct” version of patent law and that departures from this version
reflect misunderstandings or mistakes.64 To the contrary, inventors have no
inherent or “natural” right to exclusive control of their inventions, nor is
there any inherent or natural set of rights for when a patent must issue or
what rights it must provide.65 Instead, patent rights only exist as an
affirmative act of governmental power on the terms and conditions the
government sets as a matter of public policy.66 The United States
Constitution expressly treats patents as a public policy tool that Congress
may (but is not required to67) issue but only when, and to the extent, they
promote progress of technological innovation.68 Otherwise, the Constitution
largely leaves it to Congress to decide what terms and conditions are
necessary to insure that patents will promote technological innovation.69 As
explained above, Congress responded by writing the patent statutes in broad,
significant part of members of the patent bar. The patent bar can roughly be characterized as an expert
community: “an institutionalized group of experts that develop and apply a system of abstract knowledge
to address a specific set of questions” and “are largely autonomous from the state, with independent
entrance exams, licensing procedures, and ethical guidelines.” Id. at 94, 116.
64. See Quinn, supra note 5 (“Clearly the claims at issue in this case are patent eligible subject
matter. The Supreme Court is wrong . . .”).
65. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual
Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 99 (1995).
66. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the scope established by the
Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.”).
67. See Walterscheid, supra note 65.
68. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (“Nor may [Congress] enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.”).
69. Id. at 8 (“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement
the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the
constitutional aim.”).
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general terms that delegated to the courts primary responsibility for defining
the terms and conditions on which patents should issue. Thus, when the
Supreme Court resolves an issue of patent law, it is making a policy choice
(within the broad boundaries set by Congress) about the proper scope of
patent protection and terms and conditions for obtaining patent protection.
The rhetoric that the Supreme Court misunderstands patent law
oversimplifies the Supreme Court’s task. It suggests that there is a single
“true” or “correct” outcome that can be discerned simply from the sparse
language of the statute and the existing precedent. However, Congress’s
choice to write the patent statutes largely in broad, general terms and
withhold substantive rulemaking authority from the Patent Office leaves the
courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, with the difficult task of achieving
patent law’s delicate balance between promoting innovation without unduly
restricting competition or follow-on innovation.70
Acknowledging that the patent law issues confronted by the Supreme
Court are matters of public policy, not efforts to identify some abstract
“right” answer, will lead to a more honest and useful debate about the policy
outcomes of various doctrinal choices, improving the quality of the
information the Supreme Court receives and hopefully the quality of the
choices it makes.71 It will also shed more light on the difficult task the
Supreme Court confronts. This may help explain some shortcomings
commentators identify in its case law, including its tendency to adopt broad
standards that must be fleshed out by the lowers in future case-by-case
adjudication,72 in a way that enhances the Court’s legitimacy.
Second, and relatedly, the rhetoric of misunderstanding treats the
current state of patent law (or the state of patent law before the Supreme
Court became active) as the baseline and departures from the status quo as
misunderstandings or mistakes. For example, one commentator criticized the
Supreme Court’s Mayo decision by saying that “[i]f a student were to write
such nonsense in a patent law paper or on a patent law final exam they would
receive little, if any, credit.”73 This is an odd criticism of a Supreme Court
decision. A student taking a patent law exam is explaining the current state
of the law. But when an issue reaches the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
is trying to decide whether the current state of the law is correct (based on
the statute, the stare decisis effect of prior decisions, and public policy

70. Nard, supra note 26, at 30-40 (describing complex economic balance of patent system).
71. Cf. Taylor, supra note 11, at 645-652 (noting extensive criticism of Federal Circuit for narrow
focus on parsing precedent that ignores policy issues underlying its decision).
72. Lee, supra note 6, at 63-64.
73. Quinn, supra note 5.
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considerations). Essentially, the criticism reflects status quo bias that
assumes patent law necessarily must be its current version.
To the contrary, because patent law is a tool of public policy, it is
dynamic and can adjust to the changing needs of society. The original 1790
Patent Act provided for examination by high level cabinet officers to
determine if the invention was both useful and “important,” but quickly
proved infeasible and gave way to a registration system in the 1793 Act that
granted patents for mere compliance with clerical requirements.74 Because it
was adopted when the country was largely agricultural, the registration
system proved insufficient as the country developed manufacturing and
national markets, ultimately being replaced by an examination system in
1836.75 The courts also have used the significant discretion conferred on
them by the broad terms of the statute to adjust patent law to a changing
society, from the needs of the Industrial Revolution to the needs of war
mobilization during World War II.76 In fact, it is ironic to criticize the
Supreme Court for departing from the status quo of patent law. The status
quo only resulted from the significant changes introduced into patent law by
the Federal Circuit since 1982.77 The creation of the Federal Circuit, and the
changes it introduced, were an express effort to accommodate patent law to
the then-current policy needs, particularly the concern that American
technological progress had stagnated in the 1970s and the United States was
losing its dominance in the world economy.78
By ignoring the dynamic nature of patent law, the rhetoric of Supreme
Court misunderstanding hinders the tailoring of patent law to the changing
needs of society. The result could be the lock-in of a particular version of
patent law that was good for needs of society at one point in time but does
not reflect the current circumstances.
Third, the rhetoric of Supreme Court misunderstanding suggests that
there are right and wrong answers to patent law questions. This causes
competing interests within the patent system to believe there position is
“right” and the other side is “wrong,” making them less willing to engage
with the ideas of others with whom they disagree, to recognize the
ambiguities and uncertainties in innovation policy and patent reform

74. Nard, supra note 26, at 20-22.
75. Id. at 22-23
76. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 9-10 (6th ed. 2013).
77. Nard, supra note 14, at 74-75.
78. See Dreyfuss, supra note 34, at 6-8.
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proposals, and to compromise on questions of patent policy.79 The result is
further polarization within a patent community that is already highly
polarized between those who believe in expanding patent rights and those
who believe in limiting patent rights.80 This creates a poisonous atmosphere
for patent policy debates and stagnates patent reform as competing interest
groups cancel each other out.
Fourth, the contention that the Supreme Court does not understand
patent law delegitimizes the Supreme Court’s decisions in patent law and
encourages efforts to circumvent them. The Federal Circuit has shown “a
pattern of resistance to implementing Supreme Court decisions overruling
Federal Circuit precedent.”81 The rhetoric from segments of the patent
community that the Supreme Court does not understand patent law
encourages this type of resistance from the Federal Circuit and the lower
courts. For example, one commentator labeled the Supreme Court’s Mayo
decision as “lawless”82 and called upon the Federal Circuit to “overrule” the
decision by “work[ing] to moderate (and eventually overturn) this
embarrassing display by the Supreme Court.”83 Similarly, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has been widely criticized for
attracting nearly half of the country’s patent litigation by consistently
skewing the way it handles patent cases in favor of patentees.84 Yet, some
have defended the Eastern District of Texas for resisting what they perceive
as recent anti-patent trends, including Supreme Court decisions.85
79. See Ouellette, supra note 31, at 28 (“[A]dvocates and policymakers on both sides of the patent
wars often fail to acknowledge the ambiguity of evidence on issues such as whether patents promote
innovation.”).
80. See generally id. (describing polarization within patent community).
81. Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 63, at 124.
82. Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A lawless decision by an omnipotent Court wreaking havoc
on patents, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-vprometheus-lawless-decision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/.
83. Quinn, supra note 5.
84. See generally Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016)
(summarizing issues with Eastern District of Texas).
85. See Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Politics of Patent Venue Reform: SCOTUS Taking TC
Heartland to Delay Push for Venue Reform, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/09/politics-patent-venue-scotus-tc-heartland-dela-venuereform/id=76639/ (“Patent owners have resisted venue reform because it has largely felt like infringers
were trying to foreclose the one district court where they were given a fair chance to prevail.”); Michael
Rosen, VENUE Act would tighten leash on patent litigation, but draws criticism, TECHPOLICYDAILY
(Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/technology/venue-act-would-tighten-leash-on-patentlitigation-but-draws-criticism/ (describing popularity of Eastern District of Texas based on “the relative
unwillingness of judges in the district to grant” motions based on Supreme Court’s Alice decision); Gene
Quinn, Patent Reform Returns: Venue Reform Bill to be introduced in Senate, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 7,
2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/03/07/patent-reform-returns-venue-reform-bill-introducedsenate/id=66849/ (saying Eastern District of Texas is “increasingly viewed as one of the few courts where
the little guy has at least a fair opportunity to prevail”).
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However, the Supreme Court is at the top of the judicial hierarchy and
the Federal Circuit and district courts are bound by its decisions, whether
they like them or not. The suggestion that the Federal Circuit or district
courts should circumvent Supreme Court decisions due to the Supreme
Court’s supposed misunderstanding of patent law ignores the proper role of
these courts within the hierarchy of the judiciary. It also suggests that actors
are free to ignore binding authority simply because they disagree with it. This
undercuts the authority of law in our society, encouraging actors to instead
substitute their own policy judgments for the decisions that they are bound
to implement. In this way, the rhetoric of Supreme Court misunderstanding
undermines the constraints law imposes in our country, albeit in a minor way
given patent law’s limited salience in society.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the whole, there is no reasonable basis to contend that the Supreme
Court does not understand patent law. Rather, the segments in the patent
community pushing this contention seem to mistake policy disagreements
for misunderstanding by the Supreme Court. This mistake, even if one
primarily of rhetoric, has potentially negative consequences for
understanding the role of patent law, promoting productive debates about
patent law and policy, and preserving the Supreme Court’s legitimacy in
patent law and patent law’s (perhaps limited) contribution to the constraints
imposed by legal authority.

